ECE 443/518 – Computer Cyber Security Lecture 07 Authenticated Encryption

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Outline

Message Authentication Codes

Authenticated Encryption

Complexity Theory

Reading Assignment

► This lecture: UC 12, 5.1.6

► Next lecture: UC 6.3

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Motivation

- Cryptographic hash functions help to achieve integrity on an insecure channel with an additional authentic channel.
 - Without using a secret key.
- ► In the context of symmetric cryptography, since there is already a secret key, can integrity be achieved without the additional authentic channel?
- Message authentication: prove that the message is authentic.
 - ▶ I.e. created by a party knowing the secrey key.
- ▶ Don't confuse it with user authentication.
 - ▶ User authentication: prove you are youself.
 - Preferably unclonable information but usually via a secret.
 - But if Alice proves to Oscar that she is Alice by showing Oscar the secret, how to prevent Oscar to convince Bob that he/she is Alice by showing the same secret?

Message Authentication Codes (MACs)

- ▶ $MAC_k(x)$: a function that returns a fixed-size code that depends on both the message x and the secret key k.
- ▶ Alice computes $m = MAC_k(x)$ and sends (x, m) to Bob.
 - ► Since for now we only discuss integrity, everything except *k* are known by the adversary Oscar.
- ▶ Bob receives (x', m') and verifies that $m' == MAC_k(x')$.
 - ▶ The active adversary Oscar may change both x and m.
- ightharpoonup How about use a cryptographic hash function h?
 - ▶ Secret prefix: $MAC_k(x) = h(k||x)$
 - Secret suffix: $MAC_k(x) = h(x||k)$

Oscar's Attacks

- ▶ Most hash functions consume a message byte by byte.
- ▶ Oscar knows x and $m = MAC_k(x) = h(k||x)$.
- Secret prefix: Oscar can compute h(k||x||y) by initializing h with h(k||x) and then proceed with the message y.
 - There is no need to know k to compute $MAC_k(x||y) = h(k||x||y)$.
- Secret suffix: if Oscar knows h(x') == h(x) from birthday attack on h, then h(x'||k) == h(x||k).
 - ▶ There is no need to know k to compute $MAC_k(x') = h(x'||k)$.
- Better solutions?

HMAC




Fig. 12.2 HMAC construction

- ► RFC 2104 (1997), FIPS PUB 198-1 (2008)
- Use a cryptographic hash function h
 - \triangleright k^+ : zero extended to match hash block size.
 - Padding: 0x5c for opad and 0x36 for ipad.
 - Usually without using the IV.

(Paar and Pelzl)

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CBC-MAC




Fig. 12.3 MAC built from a block cipher in CBC mode

(Paar and Pelzl)

- ▶ Use a block cipher. Only need encryption e().
- A lot of pitfalls exist
 - ▶ Use a random IV (shown above as suggested by the textbook!)
 - ► Not include message length.
 - Share the secret key for encryption and MAC.
 - etc.
- Don't implement your own. Use an established library.

GMAC

- A variant of the Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
- Usually a MAC is used together with a symmetric cipher to provide both confidentiality and integrity so let's delay the discussion of GMAC to GCM.

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
Motivation

- It is quite intuitive that one may combine a symmetric ciphers and a MAC to achieve confidentiality and integrity (including message authentication) with a secret key.
- ► Three possible combinations
 - ► Encrypt-then-MAC: append MAC of ciphertext to ciphertext
 - Encrypt-and-MAC: append MAC of plaintext to ciphertext
 - MAC-then-Encrypt: append MAC of plaintext to plaintext
- ► Which one?

Chosen Ciphertext Attacks

- Oscar may create ciphertexts.
 - Usually by modifying ciphertexts sending by Alice.
- ► Then Oscar may send them to Bob and observe how Bob decrypts/validates them.
 - Bob may response whether the message decrypts/validates correctly.
 - Oscar may further meature time taken by Bob to generate the response (side channel).
- ▶ For both Encrypt-and-MAC and MAC-then-Encrypt, the validation is with plaintext so that Oscar may obtain plaintext bit-by-bit if he/she may modify ciphertext to cause a few bits to change in plaintext.
- Not a concern for Encrypt-then-MAC as Bob will reject incorrect ciphertexts without decrypt them and Oscar learns nothing.

Galois Counter Mode (GCM)



(Wikipedia)

- ▶ NIST Special Publication 800-38D (2007), various RFCs
- ▶ Work with block ciphers using 128-bit blocks.

More on GCM

- Encryption/decryption are in the Counter Mode.
 - Counter 0 is derived from the IV.
- ► MAC
 - Allow to include additional authenticated data (AAD), i.e. Auth Data 1 in the figure, that require only integrity but no confidentiality.
 - Compute authentication subkey $H = e_k(0)$.
 - Treat all 128-bit blocks (padding as needed) as numbers in the Galois field $GF(2^{128})$ and perform multiplications and additions to generate Auth Tag.
- ▶ It is critical that the combined choice of k and IV should be unique. Otherwise the GCM mode is not secure.
- In addition to GCM, other modes for authenticated encryption exist.

GCM Implementation

- Block cipher in counter mode.
 - No need to implement block decryption.
 - Can be parallelized.
 - Usually use AES to leverage existing hardware accelerations.
- MAC essentialy evaluates a polynomial.
 - Can be parallelized.
 - ▶ Addition in *GF*(2¹²⁸) is bitwise XOR.
 - Multiplication can be accelerated by special hardware, accessible on many modern processors through special instructions.

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Greatest Common Divisor (GCD)

- ightharpoonup gcd(a, b): greatest common divisor of integers a and b.
 - Assume at least one of a and b is not 0.
- Examples
 - ightharpoonup gcd(27,21)=3
 - ightharpoonup gcd(10, 12) = 2
 - ightharpoonup gcd(3,16) = 1
 - ightharpoonup gcd(4,16) = 4
- Algorithm to compute gcd() on computers?

Simple GCD Algorithm

```
Input: two integers a \ge b > 0

1 For k = b downto 1:

2 If (b \mod k == 0) and (a \mod k == 0):

3 Report gcd(a, b) = k
```

- ► How efficient is the algorithm?
 - As you may have observed and guessed, the most time consuming parts are the mod operations in the loop.
 - In the worse case when gcd(a, b) = 1, there are $2b \mod operations$.
- Still, we need <u>complexity theory</u> to understand how good or how bad that is.

The Big-O Notation

- Performance of an algorithm
 - Time complexity: how long does it take?
 - Space complexity: how many memory does it consume?
 - Complexities depend on problem sizes.
- ► The measure should be independent of computer architectures and clock frequencies.
 - A rough measure of trends for large problem sizes.
- ▶ The big-O notation: complexity measure of trends
 - ▶ N: problem size
 - \triangleright O(1): the complexity is independent of problem size
 - \triangleright O(N): the complexity grows no faster than N
 - $ightharpoonup O(N^2)$: the complexity grows no faster than N^2
 - $O(2^N)$: the complexity grows no faster than 2^N
 - And so on ...

Time Complexity of Simple GCD Algorithm

- Problem size N: assume a and b are N-bit numbers.
- Complexity of arithmetic operations
 - Addition and subtraction: O(N)
 - Multiplication, division, and mod: $O(N^2)$ (could be better)
 - What about power and exponential?
- ▶ Time complexity of simple GCD algorithm: $O(2^N N^2)$.

Cryptography Meets Complexity

- Exponential time vs polymonial time
 - Exponential time: $O(2^N)$, $O(3^N)$, etc.
 - ▶ E.g. brute-force attack on *N*-bit keys take $O(2^N)$ time.
 - Polymonial time: O(N), $O(N^2)$, $O(N^{1000})$, etc.
- Exponential time (or worse) algorithms are too slow for computationally bounded parties (for large N).
- Computationally bounded parties can execute polynomial time algorithms efficiently (for large N).
- Assume all of Alice, Bob, and Oscar have bounded computational power.
 - ▶ If there is a problem Alice and Bob could solve in polynomial time,
 - while Oscar need to spend exponential or more time to solve,
 - ▶ then Alice and Bob could always choose a large enough *N* so that they can solve it but Oscar cannot solve it practically.

Summary

- MAC authenticates the message using the secret key.
- While it appears to be intuitive to create your own MAC for message authentication, or to combining block ciphers with MAC for authenticated encryption, there are a lot of pitfalls for both design and implementaion – you should follow documented standards exactly or use an established library instead.