ECE 443/518 – Computer Cyber Security Lecture 17 Secure Collaborations

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Outline

Secure Collaborations

Coin Flipping

Reading Assignment

- ► This lecture: Secure Collaborations
- ► Next lecture: Consensus and Cryptocurrency

Outline

Secure Collaborations

Coin Flipping

Collaborations

- Parties collaborate to achieve a common objective.
 - For purposes like doing business, gambling, decision making.
 - Involve both computation and communication.
- Lack of trust: what if someone cheats?
 - Leakage of sensitive data.
 - Manipulation toward unfair or incorrect results.
- Laws help to protect against such issues in our daily life.
 - ▶ Need enforcement, by some party that is trusted by everyone.
 - Only for deterrence.
- What about reliability issues like corrupted computation or communication?

Secure Collaborations

- Solve collaboration as a security problem.
- ► Threats: everyone will cheat whenever possible.
 - ► There is no trusted third party.
 - This also models failures in communication channels either the sender sends bad messages or the receiver claims to receive bad messages.
- Policy: objective of collaboration as security properties.
 - ► E.g. authentication, integrity, and confidentiality.
 - For our lectures, we assume authentication is supported by digital signatures, and focus on different collaborations that may require different levels of integrity and confidentiality.
- Mechanism and protocol design to enforce policy.
 - Allow parties to participate if they behave well.
 - Reject parties whenever they cheat.

Outline

Secure Collaborations

Coin Flipping

Coin Flipping

- ▶ The most primitive (true) random number generator.
 - Widely used in dispute resolution.
- ► The coin flipping game between Alice and Bob.
 - 1. Alice calls the coin flip $C \in \{heads, tails\}$.
 - 2. Bob flips the coin and report the result *R*.
 - 3. Alice wins if C == R; otherwise Bob wins.
- ► Fair coin: 50/50 chance for heads/tails.
 - ▶ If we assume that Alice can observe Bob's coin flipping results to decide the chances of heads/tails, then Bob have to use a fair coin to avoid losing money in the long run.
- ▶ What if Alice and Bob need to play the game over phone?
 - No trusted third party.

Cheaters

- ▶ Bob cheats by knowing Alice's call C and reporting $R \neq C$.
 - ▶ Bob can further provide a video of *R*.
 - ► If you are thinking about live streaming, why you believe the streaming is live?
- If we modify the game to ask Bob to flip and report R first, then Alice may cheat by calling C = R.

Mechanism Design: Commitment Scheme

- ► Commitment scheme: allow one to publish a secret message that will be revealed at a later time.
 - Commitment: the message cannot be modified once published.
- ightharpoonup Commitment scheme can be implemented via hash h().
 - 1. Alice chooses a random number k and sends Bob a = h(C||k).
 - 2. Bob sends R.
 - 3. Alice reveals C and k for Bob to verify h(C||k) == a.
 - 4. Alice wins if C == R; otherwise Bob wins.
- ▶ Bob cannot cheat as long as h() is preimage resistant.
 - ightharpoonup Otherwise Bob can recover C from a and report R=C.
- ▶ Alice cannot cheat as long as h() is collision resistant.
 - Otherwise Alice can find k_1 and k_2 to satisfy $h(heads||k_1) == h(tails||k_2)$, and reveal k_1 or k_2 depending on Bob's R.

Dice Roller and Mental Poker

- ▶ How can Alice and Bob roll a dice over the phone?
- ► A real challenge: how can Alice and Bob play poker over the phone?

Outline

Secure Collaborations

Coin Flipping

- Data management
 - ▶ Data set: other's public keys, business transactions, etc.
 - Operations: CRUD (Create, Read, Update and Delete).
- Collaborative
 - Everyone is allowed to modify the data.
- Security property
 - Ignore confidentiality.
 - Integrity and nonrepudiation: integrity is violated if someone modifies data without following a protocol; optionally, nonrepudiation helps to identify who modifies the data.
 - Version control and auditing: track history of how the data set changes, and know who made the change via nonrepudiation.
- ▶ Integrity also detects data corruption.
 - E.g. due to faults in memory, hard drive, and networks.
 - ▶ It is possible to recover corrupted data, though the techniques are out of the scope of this course.

A Naive Protocol

- Append to the data set its own hash.
 - ▶ Sign the hash if nonrepudiation is required.
- ▶ Store all versions of the data set and the hash.
 - As well as the signatures for auditing.
- Issues
 - Performance: not efficient to hash a large data set whenever it is modified.
 - Storage: cannot afford to store all versions of a large data set.
 - ▶ Auditing: we need to prove that the two versions is indeed before and after a change storing all versions does not help.


Integrity and Data Structure

- For performance concerns, it is perferable to only hash the modification but not the whole data set.
 - ▶ Need to understand how the data set manages data.
- A popular choice of data structure is a tree.
 - Unsorted to represent hierarchical data, e.g. files and directories.
 - Sorted to represent key-value associations, e.g. map/dictionary or database tables.
 - Other data structures can be treated as a tree, e.g. linked list as a tree without branches.
- We can hash the tree nodes instead of the whole tree.
 - Modification to a tree is limited to the path from the node being modified to the root – to hash all nodes along the path is efficient!
 - But how can the relations between the nodes be protected?

Hashes as 'Cryptographic' Pointers

- Tree uses pointers to maintain relations between nodes.
 - Pointers cannot be reused in different programs, not to mention on different computers used for collaboration.
 - Anyone can modify a node and then the whole subtree, without being caught.
 - ▶ We need pointers that provide cryptographic guarantees.
- ▶ Merkle hash tree: hash of a node can work as its address.
 - Does not rely on a particular program or computer.
 - Practically, collision resistant implies that two nodes will have different hashes if they have different content.
- Nonrepudiation can be achieved by signing the hashes and store the signatures with the hashes.

Example: Git




Git is a popular software for version control.

(Pro Git)

- Data set as a Merkle hash tree.
 - ► Two types of nodes: blob for files, tree for directories.
 - Each node is hashed with SHA-1 (only first 20 bits are shown).
- ▶ Integrity is guaranteed since modification of node content without changing it hash in the parent node will be detected.


Version Control



(Pro Git)

- ► Each modification results in a new root node.
- Replaced nodes are preserved for version control.
- There is no need to store any node more than once.
 - ▶ No matter how many times it appears in the history.


Integrity of History



(Pro Git)

- Use another Merkle hash tree consisting of 'commit' nodes to protect integrity of history.
 - The data structure is actually a directed acyclic graph (DAG), though the idea of using hashes to replace pointers is the same.
- What if multiple parties modify the data set at the same time?

Branches



- Git allows simultaneous modifications to happen on different branches of the tree consisting of commits.
 - With some efforts, branches can be merged to incorporate changes together.
- ► What if we need to apply similiar ideas to an application where branches are not allowed?
 - ► Then multiple parties need to agree on what 'main branch' to modify and who makes the modification.
 - That is another difficult secure collaboration problem.

Summary

- Seemingly impossible secure collaborations, like coin flipping, can be implemented via cryptographic constructions.
- ► Merkle hash tree provides an all-in-one solution for complex data management tasks with integrity guarantee.